We take a game-theoretic approach to the analysis of juries by modelling voting as a game of incomplete information. Rather than the usual assumption of two possible signals (one indicating guilt, the other innocence), we allow jurors to perceive a full spectrum of signals. Given any voting rule requiring a fixed fraction of votes to convict, we characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of the game, and we consider the possibility of asymmetric equilibria: we give a condition under which no asymmetric equilibria exist and show that, without it, asymmetric equilibria may exist. We offer a condition under which unanimity rule exhibits a bias toward convicting the innocent, regardless of the size of the jury, and we exhibit an example showing this bias can be reversed. And we prove a "jury theorem" for our general model: as the size of the jury increases, the probability of a mistaken judgment goes to zero for every voting rule, except unanimity rule; for unanimity rule, we give a condition under which the probability of a mistake is bounded strictly above zero, and we show that, without this condition, the probability of a mistake may go to zero.
Introduction
Consider a group of decision-makers who must choose one of two alternatives. Voters agree on the overall objective, but, on the basis of differential information, they may disagree on which alternative best achieves that goal. Some examples are:
• A jury deciding whether to convict or acquit a defendant. Jurors agree about the desirability of acquitting an innocent and convicting a guilty defendant, but they have different opinions about whether the defendant is innocent or guilty.
• The board of directors of a company deciding whether to approve a new investment project. All members of the board agree on the desirability of higher profits, but they disagree about whether the project is profitable.
• A group of medical experts deciding on a treatment for a patient. The common objective is the patient's health, but there is disagreement about the best procedure for the patient.
Though such examples are necessarily special, in that they presume a common objective shared among the decision-makers, they have provided a useful benchmark for the investigation of information aggregation in collective decision-making.
We follow an old literature on information aggregation in elections by focusing on the jury example. The literature traces back to Condorcet's (1785) jury theorem, which asserts that, under majority voting, large electorates should reach correct decisions with very high probability (cf. Miller (1986) , Grofman and Feld (1988) , Young (1988) , Ladha (1992) , Berg (1993) ). It is traditionally assumed that each voter simply behaves "naively," as if deciding the outcome alone, but Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) observed that, given naive behavior on the part of jurors, some may have an incentive to vote "strategically." In other words, naive behavior does not generally constitute an equilibrium. The issue of strategic voting under incomplete information was also taken up by Pesendorfer (1996, 1997) . We follow subsequent papers in analyzing voting in juries as a Bayesian game in which 1 the jurors' opinions of guilt or innocence, i.e., their "signals," are private information.
Several versions of the jury theorem under strategic voting have been offered. Myerson (1998) introduces uncertainty about the size of the electorate and considers a countable set of players' types (signals), where the number of voters receiving any given signal is drawn from a Poisson distribution, the mean of which depends on guilt or innocence. He proves the existence of a sequence of equilibria that generate the results of Condorcet's jury theorem as the expected number of jurors goes to infinity. Wit (1998) shows that, in the Austen-Smith and Banks model, the non-trivial equilibria of the voting game corroborate Condorcet's jury theorem. More generally, McClennan (1998) proves that, given any voting rule, there is at least one equilibrium that maximizes the ex ante payoffs of jurors over the class of all symmetric strategy profiles. Since naive voting is a symmetric strategy profile, each juror's payoff from that optimal equilibrium strategy profile is at least equal to the payoff from voting naively. As a consequence, if Condorcet's jury theorem holds under naive voting, then it will also hold in the optimal equilibrium. If there are no other equilibria, then, of course, the jury theorem is completely robust to the strategic incentives of the jurors. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) analyze a model in which there are two possible signals, one indicating guilt and the other innocence. Given any voting rule requiring a fixed fraction of votes to convict, they are able to explicitly solve for the unique symmetric, responsive Bayesian equilibrium of the voting game. They show that a jury theorem holds for all voting rules other than unanimity: as the size of the jury increases, the probability of a mistaken judgment goes to zero for all voting rules except unanimity; in that case, the probability of a mistake is bounded strictly above zero. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) also give an example comparing different voting rules for a fixed jury size: there, the probability of convicting an innocent defendant under unanimity rule is greater than the probability under majority or any other supermajority rule. McKelvey and Palfrey (1998) offer experimental results on the "binary signal" model roughly consistent with the equilibrium predictions.
We depart from the previous literature on juries by assuming that the signals representing the jurors' opinions of guilt or innocence are drawn from continuous, rather than discrete (usually binary), distributions. This is meant to capture the fact that a juror's opinion of the evidence against the defendant, the case made by the prosecutor, etc., may reflect a very rich spectrum of possibilities -possibilities that cannot be summarized by a dichotomous signal merely indicating guilt or innocence. We impose very few restrictions on the distributions of signals, and we obtain a continuous analogue of the binary signal model as a special case. Unlike Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997), we confine our attention to the case in which the objectives of the jurors are perfectly aligned. Within this framework, we investigate the issues of equilibrium existence and uniqueness, the generalization of Feddersen and Pesendorfer's (1998) jury theorem, as well as the extension of their results on the inferiority of unanimity rule.
We offer three sets of results. First, we establish the existence of a symmetric, responsive equilibrium characterized by a cutoff signal: jurors who get signals indicating a higher likelihood of guilt vote for convicting the defendant while those who get signals indicating a lower likelihood vote for acquittal. The equilibrium is unique within that class. Moreover, under a strict monotone likelihood ratio condition, all equilibria are cutoff equilibria; as a consequence, our uniqueness result extends to the class of all symmetric, responsive strategy profiles, even allowing for mixed strategies. With McClennan's (1998) result, this implies that the equilibrium is optimal: it maximizes the jurors' ex ante payoffs over the set of symmetric strategy profiles. An undesirable artifact of the binary signal model of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) , and of the continuous version we consider, is that the typical juror who votes to acquit must use mixed strategies and is, therefore, indifferent between voting to acquit or convict. When continuous distributions are allowed for, that need no longer be the case. Indeed, under the strict monotone likelihood ratio condition, all equilibria are essentially strict: only a juror who receives the cutoff signal (a zero probability event) is indifferent to which vote he casts.
Second, we turn our attention to unanimity rule and give a sufficient condition for the symmetric, responsive cutoff equilibrium to be unique within the class of all (possibly asymmetric) responsive strategy profiles. We then give a sufficient condition for unanimity rule to exhibit a bias toward convicting the innocent, independently of the size of the jury. This condition is met in our continuous version of the binary signal model, with the following implication: unanimity rule leads to a higher probability a convicted defendant is innocent than does majority or any other supermajority rule. Thus, we find that Feddersen and Pesendorfer's (1998) fixed jury size example generalizes within the binary signal model. However, it does not generalize completely: we provide an example of a continuous signal model in which unanimity rule performs better than simple majority rule. We then we turn to the asymptotic behavior of unanimity rule and find, in contrast to Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1988) , that our conclusions depend on the structure of information in the model: the probability of making a mistake is bounded strictly above zero if the likelihood of innocence is bounded over the interval of possible signals; otherwise, as illustrated by an example, it is possible that the probability of a mistaken judgment goes to zero as the size of the jury increases.
Third, we obtain a jury theorem for the general continuous signal model: for all voting rules other than unanimity, the probability of a mistaken judgment goes to zero as the size of the jury increases. The asymptotic efficiency of all non-unanimous voting rules is fully general, and not merely an artifact of the binary signal model. Under stronger informational assumptions than those of our model, but still assuming continuous signals, Meirowitz (1999) establishes existence and uniqueness of symmetric equilibria and also proves a jury theorem for non-unanimous voting rules. As he notes, an implication is that large juries perform better than single jurors under strategic voting, a result obtained by Condorcet (1985) under naive voting.
We leave many important issues untouched. One is the extension of our results to situations in which the jurors' preferences are not perfectly aligned, a necessary step in order to use the continuous signal model in other voting contexts. Under slightly stronger informational assumptions than ours, Li, Rosen, and Suen (1999) take up this issue in a continuous signal model with two jurors. Some other issues are: correlation among the jurors' signals, multiple "states," and multiple alternatives. Furthermore, we have not considered the optimality of different voting rules, an important but apparently difficult mechanism design issue. Finally, there is the possibility of limited communication among jurors. As stressed by Coughlan (1997) , a single nonbinding "straw vote" is enough to allow jurors to share all their information in the binary signal model, thus eliminating the strategic aspects of voting in a common preference environment. In general, a finite number of "straw votes" is enough to allow jurors to share all their information if the distribution of signals is discrete. But, when the opinions of jurors can reflect subtle nuances of trials, a continuous distribution of signals seems better suited to model the difficulties associated with limited communication.
Preliminaries
We consider n ≥ 2 jurors who must decide whether to convict or acquit a defendant. The defendant is either innocent, I, or guilty, G, with probabilities P (I) and P (G). Each juror i receives a real-valued signal s i distributed according to F (·|I) or F (·|G), depending on whether the defendant is innocent or guilty. Conditional on the state, the signals of the jurors are drawn independently. After receiving their signals, which are private information, the jurors simultaneously vote to convict or acquit. Once the votes are tallied, the defendant's fate is determined by an anonymous, monotonic decision rule, i.e., there is some integer, k, such that the defendant is convicted, C, if k or more jurors vote to convict and acquitted, A, otherwise.
We assume the jurors have a common preference to convict the guilty and acquit the innocent. We assume that these outcomes are equally desirable and normalize the jurors' payoffs in those cases to u(C|G) = u(A|I) = 0. In the cases of convicting the innocent or acquitting the guilty, the jurors receive negative payoffs u(C|I) and u(A|G). In effect, the ex ante cost of conviction is u(C|I)P (I), and the cost of acquittal is u(A|G)P (G). We use
to denote the relative ex ante cost of acquittal. A strategy for juror i is a measurable mapping σ i :
, where σ i (s i ) is the probability that the juror votes to convict after receiving signal s i . The probability that i votes to convict, conditional on the defendant being innocent, is
where µ I is the probability measure induced by F (·|I). The probability that i votes to convict conditional on guilt is identical, except that µ G , the probability measure induced by F (·|G), is used. Probabilities of acquittal are written similarly, but integrating 1 − σ i rather than σ i .
A profile of strategies is denoted σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ). Given σ, the probability that the defendant is convicted conditional on being innocent, denoted
The probability that the defendant is acquitted conditional on being guilty, denoted P σ (A|G), is
The ex ante payoff of a juror is u(C|I)P σ (C|I)P (I) + u(A|G)P σ (A|G)P (G).
Let σ −i represent the strategies of jurors other than i. The probabilities that i is pivotal conditional on innocence and guilt, P σ −i (piv|I) and P σ −i (piv|G), are defined as
respectively.
Using the above definitions, we can obtain an expression for a juror's payoff in terms of his probability of being pivotal. It translates to our framework the insight from the literature on strategic voting that a voter should condition his vote on being pivotal, as this is the only event where his vote might affect his payoff. Proposition 1 Given σ −i , the ex ante payoff to juror i from σ i is an affine transformation of
The proof of this (and other auxiliary results) is found in the appendix. An equilibrium is a profile σ such that, for every juror i and every σ i ,
A responsive equilibrium is an equilibrium σ such that each σ i is responsive:
There are always unresponsive equilibria: if k < n, it is an equilibrium for the jurors to convict regardless of their signals; if k > 1, it is an equilibrium acquit regardless of signal. A cutoff equilibrium is a pure strategy equilibrium σ such that each σ i is a cutoff strategy: there is some
for all s ∈ . The cutoff strategy associated with a given cutoff is unique up to the behavior of the juror upon receiving the cutoff signal. Given assumption (A1), below, this is a zero-probability event, and we will not distinguish between cutoff strategies that differ only at the cutoff.
In what follows we maintain several assumptions on F (·|I) and F (·|G) that, as we will see, enable us to restrict our attention to cutoff equilibria. This assumption implies that the distribution functions are differentiable at all but a finite number of points. We will use S d to denote the subset of signals in S on which F (·|I) and F (·|G) are both differentiable.
(A2) The densities have common support, S = (S, S), where S, S ∈ [−∞, ∞]:
in particular, f (s|I) > 0 and f (s|G) > 0 for all s ∈ S.
The latter implies that µ I and µ G have the same sets of measure zero. The terms "µ I -a.e." and "µ G -a.e." are thus synonymous, so we can use "a.e." without ambiguity. Note that a cutoff strategy given by s i is responsive if and only if s i ∈ S.
(A3) The likelihood ratio, f (s|I)/f (s|G), is weakly decreasing on S.
This assumption is standard and amounts to assuming that higher signals are stronger (or at least not weaker) indications of guilt. Sometimes we will want a stronger condition to hold locally: we will say that the likelihood ratio is locally strictly decreasing at x ∈ S if there is an open set containing x on which the likelihood ratio is strictly decreasing.
As we will see, a juror who behaves "naively" (i.e., as if his vote alone determines the outcome) after receiving signal s would prefer to convict if f (s|I)/f (s|G) > ρ and would prefer to acquit if f (s|I)/f (s|G) < ρ. Thus, (A4) implies that there must be a signal low enough to induce a naive juror to acquit, and a signal high enough to induce him to convict. Lemma 0, stated in the appendix, establishes some implications of (A1)-(A4). Among those that are well-known, F (·|G) exhibits (strict) first order stochastic dominance over F (·|I), and the ratios
and
are weakly decreasing.
3 Symmetric Equilibria
Consider any profile σ of responsive strategies and any juror i. Since the strategies are responsive, P σ −i (piv|G) and P σ −i (piv|I) are positive. Hence, under our assumptions the expression
is well-defined on S. Moreover, for fixed σ −i , it is weakly decreasing in its second argument by (A3). Note that J(σ −i , s) > 0 if and only if
That is, J(σ −i , s) > 0 if and only if a juror's expected payoff from voting to convict is less than the expected payoff from voting to acquit, conditional on receiving signal s and on the strategies of others. Hence, as shown in the following lemma, jurors will be inclined to acquit when J is positive and to convict when it is negative. In contrast, a naive juror would behave as if the terms P σ −i (piv|I) and P σ −i (piv|G) were equal to one, voting to acquit if
and to convict if the inequality is reversed.
Lemma 1 Given responsive strategies σ −i for jurors other than i, a strategy σ i is a best response for i if and only if it satisfies the following a.e.:
If the likelihood ratio is locally strictly decreasing at inf{s ∈ S | J(σ −i , s) ≤ 0}, σ i is a best response for i if and only if it is equivalent a.e. to the following cutoff strategyσ i :
Since J is weakly decreasing in its second argument, an implication of the first part of the preceding lemma is that jurors always have best response cutoff strategies. Hence, if a profile of strategies is an equilibrium when jurors are restricted to cutoff strategies, it will be an equilibrium of the unrestricted game. From the second part of the lemma, if the likelihood ratio is strictly decreasing, then all best responses for a juror are equivalent to cutoff strategies, regardless of the strategies of others, and all equilibria are equivalent to cutoff equilibria.
When all jurors other than i use the same cutoff strategy, given by cutoff s, we will write J(s, s) for J(σ −i , s). That is,
We will often focus on symmetric profiles of cutoff strategies, in which case we view J as a mapping defined on S × S. We have already noted that J is weakly decreasing in its second argument. The following lemma further characterizes J for the case in which the jurors use the same cutoff strategy.
Lemma 2 J is continuous and weakly decreasing in its first argument. In addition, lim s↓S J(s, s) > 0 and lim s↑S J(s, s) < 0, and thus s * = inf{s ∈ S | J(s, s) ≤ 0} ∈ S. Finally, J(s, s) = 0 has at most one solution.
2
The following theorem establishes existence of a symmetric, responsive cutoff equilibrium and uniqueness within the class of symmetric, responsive cutoff profiles. If the likelihood ratio is strictly decreasing, there are no noncutoff symmetric, responsive equilibria.
Theorem 1 There exists a symmetric, responsive cutoff equilibrium with cutoff given by s * = inf{s ∈ S | J(s, s) ≤ 0}. It is unique within the class of symmetric, responsive cutoff profiles. If the likelihood ratio is locally strictly decreasing at s * , then this equilibrium is unique a.e. within the class of all symmetric, responsive profiles.
Proof By Lemma 1, s * defines a symmetric, responsive cutoff equilibrium if and only if s * ∈ S, J(s * , s) ≥ 0 for all s < s * , and J(s * , s) ≤ 0 for all s > s * . The first condition, that s * ∈ S, follows directly from Lemma 2. Take any s < s * and suppose J(s * , s) < 0. Since J is continuous in its first argument, by Lemma 2, there is some > 0 such that s * − > s and J(s * − , s) < 0. Since J is weakly decreasing in its second argument, J(s * − , s * − ) < 0, contradicting our definition of s * . Therefore, s < s * implies J(s * , s) ≥ 0. Now take any s > s * and suppose J(s * , s) > 0. Since J is continuous in its first argument, there is some > 0 such that s * + < s and J(s * + , s) > 0. Since J is weakly decreasing in its second argument, J(s * + , s * + ) > 0. Since J is also weakly decreasing in its first argument, by Lemma 2, J(ŝ,ŝ) > 0 for allŝ < s * + , contradicting the definition of s * . Therefore, s > s * implies J(s * , s) ≤ 0, giving us the first part of the theorem. To prove the second part of the theorem, consider any s ∈ S such that J(s , s) ≥ 0 for all s < s and
Since J is weakly decreasing in its first argument, J(s * + , s * + ) ≥ 0. Since J is weakly decreasing in its second argument as well, J(s, s) ≥ 0 for all s < s * + . But J(s, s) = 0 has at most one solution, by Lemma 2, so J(s, s) > 0 for all s < s * + , contradicting our definition of s * . To prove the third part of the theorem, assume that the likelihood ratio is locally strictly decreasing at s * . In any symmetric, responsive equilibrium, the jurors use the same best response strategy. By Lemma 1, this strategy is equivalent a.e. to a cutoff strategy, and we just proved uniqueness within the class of symmetric, responsive cutoff profiles.
¤
A comparative statics result is immediate: since J(s, s) is weakly decreasing in s, s * is weakly decreasing in ρ. Intuitively, if the relative probability of guilt becomes higher, or if the relative cost of acquittal becomes higher, s * tends downward. Each juror's probability of voting to convict tends upward accordingly.
It is easily checked that, as long as S, S ∈ , there is a symmetric strategy profile that maximizes the ex ante payoff of the jurors among the class of symmetric strategy profiles: we identify a symmetric strategy profile σ = (σ, . . . ,σ) with a pointσ in the unit ball of L ∞ (S); endowing the unit ball with the weak topology, the subset of strategiesσ : → [0, 1] is compact, and the jurors' ex ante payoff is continuous inσ; therefore, an optimum exists. Moreover, by (A4), the optimal symmetric strategy profile must be responsive. Though McLennan (1998) considers a model with finite types, the proof of his Theorem 2 uses only linearity of the jurors' ex ante payoff and translates directly to our model, with the conclusion that every optimal symmetric strategy profile is an equilibrium. By Theorem 1, there is only one such profile if the likelihood ratio is strictly decreasing, and it is the unique symmetric, responsive cutoff equilibrium.
Examples
We give three examples to illustrate the general model developed above. The first is a continuous analogue of the binary signal model of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) , in which our pure strategy cutoff equilibria can be interpreted as purifications of the mixed strategy equilibria of their model. More generally, any discrete signal model could be matched with a continuous analogue in a similar way. In the second example, the signals of the jurors are exponentially distributed, a particularly tractable functional form: the ratio of hazard rates is constant (a convenient property in later sections), and the probabilities of convicting an innocent and of acquitting a guilty defendant are positive and independent of the number of jurors under unanimity rule, anticipating our result on the asymptotic inefficiency of unanimity rule under certain conditions. In the third example, the signals of the jurors have a chisquare distribution. Here, the probabilities of convicting an innocent and of acquitting a guilty defendant converge to zero as the jury size increases, anticipating a result on the asymptotic probability of convicting an innocent.
The Binary Signal Model
To define the binary signal model in our framework, let S = (0, 2),
Obviously, the likelihood ratio is bounded over S. In order to satisfy (A3) and (A4), we impose 1/2 < p < 1 and
It follows that
Note that J is weakly decreasing (strictly so if 1 < k < n), and that it is discontinuous at s = 1. See Figure 1 .
[ Figure 1 about here.]
Recall that s * is defined in the previous section as inf{s ∈ S | J(s, s) ≤ 0}. Since and ρ ≥ 1. We conclude that s * < 1 if neither (1) nor (2) hold; s * > 1 if neither (3) nor (4) hold; in those cases, s * is given by the unique solution to J(s, s) = 0. In the remaining cases, s * = 1. In particular, we note that if a supermajority is required to convict, then s * < 1 necessarily; if a majority is required and ρ ≥ 1, again s * < 1. That is, in equilibrium, jurors who receive some signals below one (indicating innocence) will vote to acquit, while those who receive other signals above one will vote to convict. Note also that s
In the model of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), jurors get one of only two possible signals: a signal that innocence is likely, which occurs with probability p if the defendant is innocent and with probability 1 − p if the defendant is guilty, and a signal that guilt is likely, which occurs with the same probabilities reversed. Our example replaces the innocence signal with a continuum of signals from 0 to 1, and the guilt signal with a continuum of signals from 1 to 2. Whereas jurors who receive the innocence signal in their model vote to acquit with some probability, say a < 1/2, and to convict with some probability 1 − a, we partition (0, 1) into two intervals (0, a) and (a, 1); jurors who receive signals in (0, a) vote to acquit, and those who receive signals in (a, 1) vote to convict. Thus, the cutoff equilibrium in our version of the binary signal model is a purification of the mixed strategy equilibrium in their model. Theorem 1 guarantees existence of a symmetric, responsive cutoff equilibrium and uniqueness within that class; but because the likelihood ratio is not anywhere locally strictly decreasing in the continuous version of the binary signal model, the theorem does not guarantee uniqueness within the larger class of all symmetric, responsive profiles. Indeed, because jurors who receive signals between 0 and 1 are indifferent between voting to convict and voting to acquit, there is a continuum of symmetric, responsive non-cutoff equilibria: we could specify any subset of (0, 1) with Lebesgue measure a and have jurors receiving signals therein vote to acquit, jurors receiving other signals vote to convict.
Before leaving the binary signal model, we calculate the hazard rates
Thus, the ratio of the hazard rate when innocent to the hazard rate when guilty increases from p/(1 − p) at s = 0 to (p/(1 − p)) 2 at s = 1, and then drops to one for 1 < s < 2.
The Exponential Model
To define the exponential model, let S = (0, ∞), f (s|I) = λe −λs , and f (s|G) = γe −γs . Again, the likelihood ratio is bounded. In order to satisfy (A3) and (A4), we need λ > γ and λ/γ > ρ. [ Figure 2 about here.]
The unique symmetric equilibrium is found by solving J(s * , s * ) = 0; for the special case of unanimity rule, we readily obtain
The hazard rates when innocent and guilty are simply λ and γ, respectively, so the ratio of hazard rates is constant. (Other examples with constant ratios of hazard rates can be easily obtained from certain parameterizations of the Pareto and Weibull distributions.) Note that, under unanimity rule, the probability of convicting the defendant conditional on innocence is
and the probability of acquitting the defendant, conditional on guilt, is
Both probabilities are strictly positive and independent of the size of the jury. As a consequence, the probability of a mistake does not diminish as the size of the jury increases.
The Chi-Square Model
To define the chi-square model, let S = (0, ∞) and define
where µ and ν are natural numbers and Γ(·) is the gamma function. In order to satisfy (A3) and (A4), we need ν > µ. Note that the likelihood ratio is unbounded and the ratio of hazard rates is strictly decreasing, two conditions important in the following sections. One numerical example is µ = 2 and ν = 4. In this case
which is strictly decreasing and continuous on S. The unique symmetric equilibrium is found by solving J(s * , s * ) = 0; for the special case of unanimity rule, we obtain s * implicitly as the solution of the equation
The probability of convicting the defendant conditional on innocence is
Using these expressions, we can establish the following proposition.
Proposition 2 In the chi-square model with µ = 2 and ν = 4, the probabilities of convicting an innocent and acquitting a guilty defendant under unanimity rule converge to zero as the jury size increases. 2
Thus, we have a conclusion in stark contrast to that derived for the exponential model, where the probabilities of mistakes are invariant with respect to the size of the jury. As we will see in the next section, Proposition 2 also contrasts with the asymptotic properties of unanimity rule in the binary signal model. The key is that the likelihood ratio is bounded in the binary signal and exponential models, but not in the chi-square.
Unanimity Rule
In this section we investigate jury decision-making under unanimity rule. We provide three results. First, we give conditions under which the symmetric, responsive cutoff equilibrium is unique among the class of all responsive profiles, dropping the qualification of symmetry. Second, we identify conditions under which unanimity rule exhibits a bias in favor of convicting innocent defendants, regardless of the size of the jury. Third, we investigate the asymptotic properties of unanimity rule: if the likelihood ratio is bounded, so that the likelihood of innocence cannot be arbitrarily great, then the probability of a mistaken judgment is bounded strictly above zero; if the likelihood ratio is unbounded, then the probability of convicting an innocent goes to zero as n grows large. From the previous section, the former applies to the binary signal and exponential models, while the latter applies to the chi-square model. Define
the hazard rates when the defendant is innocent and when guilty.
Theorem 2 If the ratio of hazard rates is strictly monotone and continuous, then the symmetric, responsive cutoff equilibrium under unanimity rule is unique within the class of all responsive cutoff profiles. If in addition the likelihood ratio is strictly decreasing, then this equilibrium is unique a.e. within the class of all responsive profiles. 2
Proof By Theorem 1, we know that there exists a unique symmetric, responsive cutoff equilibrium. Let s 1 , . . . , s n ∈ S be the cutoffs used by jurors i = 1, . . . , n in any responsive cutoff equilibrium. We will show that 
or, equivalently,
which, given strict monotonicity of the ratio of hazard rates, implies s i = s j . This establishes the uniqueness of the symmetric, responsive cutoff equilibrium within the class of all responsive cutoff profiles. If the likelihood ratio is strictly decreasing, all responsive equilibria are cutoff by Lemma 1, and uniqueness a.e. within the class of all responsive profiles follows.
¤
Because the ratio of hazard rates is strictly decreasing and continuous in the chi-square model, Theorem 2 establishes that there are no asymmetric, responsive equilibria in that model. For the binary signal model, Theorem 2 suggests that asymmetric, responsive equilibria are possible under unanimity rule because the ratio of hazard rates is discontinuous at s = 1; moreover, it is constant for 1 < s < 2. For the exponential model, the theorem suggests that asymmetric, responsive equilibria are possible, because the ratio of hazard rates is constant for every s ∈ S. In fact, it is easy to show that there is a continuum of asymmetric, responsive cutoff equilibria in the exponential model: any cutoffs s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n > 0 for the jurors satisfying
corresponds to a responsive cutoff equilibrium. (The symmetric equilibrium identified in the previous section is obtained by setting all cutoffs equal.) Note, however, that all these equilibria lead to the same probabilities of convicting an innocent and acquitting a guilty defendant, and, hence, they all lead to same expected payoff for jurors.
We turn now to a comparison between unanimity rule and other voting rules for an arbitrarily fixed jury size: we give a sufficient condition for unanimity rule to exhibit a bias in favor of convicting innocent defendants. We write s k for the cutoff corresponding to the symmetric, responsive cutoff equilibrium when the number of votes needed to convict is k. Thus, the cutoff corresponding to unanimity rule is given by s n , and the cutoff corresponding to simple majority rule (with an odd number of voters) is given by s (n+1)/2 . We write J k to make explicit the dependence of J on the decision rule. We write P k (C|I) for the probability of conviction conditional on innocence and P k (A|G) for the probability of acquittal conditional on guilt under the symmetric, responsive cutoff equilibrium, when the number of votes needed to convict is k.
Theorem 3 For all
. 2
Proof Note that
and, for k = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1,
By (4) of Lemma 0, on strict first order stochastic dominance,
Hence, for k = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1,
so it remains only to be shown that
Take any > 0 such that s n − ∈ S and s k + ∈ S. By definition of s n and s k and because J is weakly decreasing in both arguments, J n (s n − , s n − ) > 0 ≥ J k (s k + , s k + ). Note that we can write
for all s ∈ S, giving us
Taking limits and using continuity of F (·|I) and F (·|G), we have
and the assumption of the theorem delivers the desired inequality.
¤
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A direct implication of Theorem 3 is that, under the ratio of hazard rates condition, unanimity rule does not dominate any other rule in terms of mistake probabilities: P n (C|I) < P k (C|I) implies P n (A|G) > P k (A|G); and P n (A|G) < P k (A|G) implies P n (C|I) > P k (C|I). The theorem has an intuitive interpretation when P (G) = P (I), in which case it follows that
.
That is, the probability that the defendant is innocent, conditional on conviction, is higher under unanimity rule than when k votes are required to convict.
To give a more transparent sufficient condition for the result of Theorem 3, we use the following lemma, which establishes that s k is weakly decreasing in k. That is, as the number of votes required to convict the defendant increases, jurors become more willing to vote for convicting.
We can now state a corollary of Theorem 3. The proof, given Theorem 3 and Lemma 3, is straightforward.
Corollary 1 If H(s|I)/H(s|G) is weakly increasing on an open interval including
,
Applied to the binary signal model, because the ratio of hazard rates is strictly increasing from 0 to 1, we know that the conclusion of the corollary holds if s k < 1. In particular, it holds if k > Table 1 for numerical values when n = 12.) Applied to the exponential model, because the ratio of hazard rates is constant, unanimity rule exhibits a bias toward convicting the innocent compared to any other voting rule. Note, however, that the bias in Theorem 3 is expressed in terms of the ratio of the probability of convicting an innocent to the probability of convicting a guilty defendant, and not simply in terms of the probability of convicting an innocent. In the exponential model, if n = 3, ρ = 1, λ = 1/2, and γ = 1/3, then the probability of convicting an innocent under unanimity rule is (approximately) .2963 while under majority rule it is .3061. In agreement with Theorem 3, the ratio of the probability of convicting an innocent to the probability of convicting a guilty defendant is 2/3 under unanimity rule and .5889 under majority rule.
Theorem 3 cannot be applied to the chi-square model because the ratio of hazard rates is decreasing. Indeed, if n = 3, ρ = 1, µ = 2, and ν = 4, the probabilities of convicting an innocent and acquitting a guilty defendant under unanimity rule are .2474 and .2212, while the same probabilities under majority rule are .2674 and .2083. Hence, majority rule is biased towards convicting an innocent with respect to unanimity rule in the sense of a higher probability of convicting an innocent and in the sense of a higher ratio of that probability to the probability of convicting a guilty defendant. Moreover, the expected payoff for jurors is higher under unanimity rule than under majority rule.
Finally, we turn to the asymptotic properties of unanimity rule. To anticipate the notation of the asymptotic results on other voting rules in the next section, we write s n 1 for the cutoff corresponding to the symmetric, responsive cutoff equilibrium under unanimity rule when the jury size is n. (The subscript indicates the guilty vote, as a fraction of all jurors, needed to convict.) Similarly, we write J n 1 for the function J and P n 1 (C|I) and P n 1 (A|G) for the probabilities of convicting an innocent and acquitting a guilty defendant. The following lemma establishes that, under unanimity rule, the cutoff corresponding to the symmetric, responsive cutoff equilibrium converges to the lower bound of the support of the signals as the number of jurors increases. Thus, the probability that a given juror votes to acquit goes to zero.
An implication of Theorem 4, next, is that the probability of a mistaken judgment under unanimity rule is bounded strictly above zero as the number of jurors increases, if the likelihood ratio is bounded. Thus, we infer the asymptotic inefficiency of unanimity rule in the binary signal and exponential models. If the the likelihood ratio is unbounded, as in the chi-square model,
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we have seen in Proposition 2 that unanimity rule may be asymptotically efficient. In fact, we prove that the probability of convicting an innocent defendant must then go to zero as the number of jurors increases.
Theorem 4
If the likelihood ratio is bounded, then
If the likelihood ratio is unbounded, then
Proof By (A1), the likelihood ratio has at most a finite number of discontinuity points, so by Lemma 4 there exists m such that, for all n > m, s 
for all n > m, where the second inequality is just rewriting J 
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In this section, we investigate the asymptotic properties of jury decision rules other than unanimity as the jury size increases: the probability of a mistaken judgment goes to zero for every non-unanimous voting rule. Rather than specify the number of votes needed to convict, we will here define a rule by the fraction, say α, of votes needed. Given n, the decision rule requiring k votes to convict would be represented by α = k/n. For ease of exposition, we only consider combinations of α and n such that αn is an integer. We write s n α for the cutoff corresponding to the symmetric, responsive cutoff equilibrium when the α rule is used and the number of jurors is n. Similarly, we write J n α for the function J and P n α (C|I) and P n α (A|G) for the probabilities of convicting an innocent and acquitting a guilty defendant. We first verify that the ratio of hazard rates is effectively bounded for all non-unanimous rules.
We now state and prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 5 For all 0 < α < 1,
Proof Note that we can write
where we define
for all s ∈ S. From Theorem 1, for each n there is a unique symmetric, responsive cutoff equilibrium characterized by the cutoff s
We claim that L α (s 
contradicting the definition of s m α . In the second case, by Lemma 5
contradicting the definition of s m α . We now claim that L α (s) = 1 implies 1 − F (s|G) > α > 1 − F (s|I). We use the facts that x α (1 − x) 1−α is single-peaked at x = α and, by strict first order stochastic dominance, 1 − F (s|I) < 1 − F (s|G) for all s ∈ S. If α ≤ 1 − F (s|I) then α ≤ 1 − F (s|I) < 1 − F (s|G) and, by single-peakedness,
contradiction establishing the claim. Since L α is decreasing, continuous, and
(using L'Hôpital's rule and (3) of Lemma 0), the set L −1 α (1) is a non-empty closed interval, [s , s ], with S < s ≤ s < S. By continuity of the distribution functions, we can take δ > 0 such that
The last part of the proof is a straightforward application of the law of large numbers. To prove P n α (A|G) → 0, define the probability space S ∞ = S ×S ×· · · with probability measure P , the product measure generated by µ G . Define the sequence X 1 , X 2 , . . . of i.i.d. random variables satisfying
where s i is the ith component of (s 1 , s 2 , . . . ) ∈ S ∞ . By the strong law of large numbers, 1 n n i=1 X i converges almost surely to 1 − F (s + δ|G) as n goes to infinity. In particular, it converges in probability:
. . of random variables as
and note that, for m > l, Y n ≥ 1 n n i=1 X i . Hence,
or equivalently,
That is, the probability that the fraction of jurors voting to convict a guilty defendant is smaller than α goes to zero as the size of the jury goes to infinity. Therefore, P n α (A|G) → 0. The proof that P n α (C|I) → 0 is analogous.
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Inserting these expressions into u(C|I)P σ (C|I)P (I) + u(A|G)P σ (A|G)P (G) and simplifying, we get
where the last term is independent of σ i .
for alls ∈ S and allŝ <s.
for alls ∈ S and allŝ >s.
Proof Suppose σ i satisfies (8) . Take any strategy σ i , and define the sets
Note that σ i (s) = 1 for all s ∈ V and σ i (s) = 0 for all s ∈ W . Thus, using Proposition 1, the payoff from σ i to juror i exceeds the payoff from σ i by
By construction, s ∈ V implies J(σ −i , s) < 0, which implies that the integrand of the first integral is positive; s ∈ W implies J(σ −i , s) > 0, which implies that the integrand of the second integral is negative. Since σ i violates (8) if and only if V ∪ W has positive measure, any strategy satisfying (8) is a best response and any strategy violating (8) is not. If the likelihood ratio is locally strictly decreasing at inf{s ∈ S | J(σ −i , s) ≤ 0}, J(σ −i , s) = 0 has at most one solution, and hence (8) implies σ i is equivalent a.e. toσ i , a cutoff strategy. 2
Proof Continuity of J in its first argument is immediate, and weak monotonicity follows from (A3) and (2) of Lemma 0. Note that where we make use of L'Hôpital's rule, (A4), and (3) of Lemma 0. This proves the next part of the lemma. By (A1), J(s, s) has at most a finite number of discontinuity points. Therefore, since lim s↓S J(s, s) > 0, we can find s > S close enough to S so that J(s, s) > 0. Thus, s * > S. A similar argument shows that s * < S. Thus, s * ∈ S. For the last part, take any signal s such that J(s, s) = 0. We claim that, for all s > s, J(s , s ) < J(s, s) = 0. By the definition of J and (2) of Lemma 0, if
we are done. Thus, by (A3), we suppose the two likelihood ratios are equal. Note that, by (A4), either
If the first inequality holds, then
by (6) of Lemma 0. If the second holds, then
Now let x n be the probability of acquitting a guilty defendant under unanimity rule when the jury size is n. Using the equations given in the text for x n and y n we obtain x n = 1 − 1 − log y n n n y n .
which converges to zero since, given a sequence {t n } that diverges to infinity, (1 + t n /n) n e −tn converges to 1 if t n /n converges to zero. (The proof of this fact is a slight variation of a standard exercise in mathematical analysis. In particular, to prove that lim inf n→∞ (1 + t n /n) n e −tn = 1, we can use the binomial theorem to show that the difference between e tn and the first 3t n − 1 terms in (1 + t n /n) n converges to a number smaller than 3t 3tn n /2( 3t n )!, which converges to zero by an application of Stirling's formula.)
Proof Recall that
By ( Proof If not, we can extract a subsequence that converges to a limit larger than S. Without loss of generality, suppose this is true of {s Proof Suppose H = ∞, and take any subsequence along which the ratio of hazard rates diverges to infinity. Without loss of generality, suppose this is true of {s n α } itself. Note that the likelihood ratio along this sequence also diverges to infinity. We first claim that s Since the ratio of hazard rates goes to infinity along the subsequence, the subsequence must converge to S. But, applying L'Hôpital's rule, the ratio of hazard rates then converges to one along the subsequence, a contradiction. Therefore, α < 1 implies H is finite.
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